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ABSTRACT 
What is a “public intellectual”? And, what is the public responsibility of intellectuals? I 
wish to place these issues at the intersection of John Dewey’s notion of “publics” and his 
call for a recovery of philosophy, which I take to be a broader call for a recovery of 
intellectual life generally. My analysis from such a perspective will suggest the public 
responsibility of intellectuals to be at least three-fold: 1) to identify and maintain citizens’ 
focus on the concrete problems that define publics, thereby facilitating the bringing of 
publics into being and maintaining them as long as they continue to be useful for solving 
such problems; 2) to aid in the creation of experimental methods whereby social intelligence 
and resources might be better directed to those problems’ resolutions; and 3) to bring 
publics to self awareness through the redirection of traditional symbols and the forging of 
new ones so as to create shared meanings and feelings of common interest, i.e., to aid in the 
transformation of the Great Society into the Great Community. 
 
 
 
What is a “public intellectual”? And, what is the public responsibility of 
intellectuals? I wish, first, to place these issues at the intersection of John 
Dewey’s notion of “publics” and his call for a recovery of philosophy, which I 
take to be a broader call for a recovery of intellectual life generally and a 
renewal of the role of intellectuals in public life. My analysis of this first point 
will suggest that the public responsibilities of intellectuals, for Dewey, are at 
least three-fold: 1) to identify and maintain citizens’ foci on the concrete 
problems that define publics, thereby facilitating the bringing of publics into 
being and maintaining them as long as they continue to be useful for solving 
such problems; 2) to aid in the creation of experimental methods whereby 
social intelligence and resources might be better directed to those problems’ 
resolutions; and 3) to bring publics to self awareness through the redirection of 
traditional cultural symbols and the forging of new ones so as to create shared 
meanings and feelings of common interest, i.e., to aid in the transformation of 
the Great Society into the Great Community. Second, I wish to identify a 
further important responsibility of intellectuals in public life at which I believe 
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Dewey only hints and which he insufficiently develops, namely, the 
responsibility to identify, to reach out to, and to include, in a rigorous fashion 
and not merely as an afterthought, the most marginalized members of society, 
to insure that they are heard, included in public action, and thereby brought 
into the Great Community that grows from vibrant publics.  
Social philosophy, on one side, includes numerous theories concerning the 
nature of interpersonal, face-to-face relations, and the history of political 
philosophy, on another side, is largely a lengthy tale of competing accounts of 
the ideal state. Strikingly absent from the philosophical landscape are 
theoretical accounts of the vast in-between region that Dewey calls “publics.” 
Indeed, one of Dewey’s greatest contributions to political philosophy is that he 
is perhaps the first to offer a public philosophy, or, more properly, a 
philosophy of publics. 
The distinction between “private” and “public,” upon which this theory is 
premised, is nothing stable and constant: the private sphere is constituted by 
those acts whose consequences remain with their agents; by contrast, the 
public realm emerges out of the recognition of the shared, indirect 
consequences of human acts to “others beyond those immediately concerned.”1 
Publics are thus defined by their problems, viz., those problems generated by 
the indirect consequences of actions; they are constantly in the making and 
transient; and there is no single, universal public: “In no two ages or places is 
there the same public. Conditions make the consequences of associated action 
and the knowledge of them different” (256). Dewey, therefore, is inconsistent 
with his own claims when he repeatedly speaks of the public, and his book 
more properly should be entitled “Publics and Their Problems.” 
Dewey’s manner of distinguishing private and public seems extremely 
simple and eminently commonsensical but is nonetheless subtle, radical, and 
profound: by drawing the distinction in terms of the consequences rather than 
in terms of the origins of actions, Dewey, from the start, takes away from 
conservative interests the ability to deny public accountability for their 
actions by claiming such actions to be “private” by virtue of their origin. I 
think here of Seattle-based Simpson Timber denying any public accountability 
and hence culpability for the desecration of the Madd River in northern 
California because, after all, it was just cutting down trees on its own “private 
                                                 
1The Public and Its Problems: An Essay in Political Inquiry (1927), in John Dewey, The 
Later Works, 1925-1953 (hereafter cited as LW), ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Vol. 2, 1925-1927 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 243-44. 
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property.” Similarly, downsizing corporations can not escape public 
accountability by claiming that decisions to hire and fire are “private” matters 
of the corporation because such decisions are made by the private owners of 
the corporation and their agents: such decisions, by Dewey’s account, carry 
consequences for persons other than the private corporate owners and thus are 
public decisions and subject to public scrutiny. 
Dewey’s definition of “public” in terms of the consequences of actions has 
significance, too, in identifying who counts as a “public philosopher.” Cornel 
West seems to apply Dewey’s definition when he rightfully notes that “public 
intellectuals” are not necessarily those who speak outside the academy but 
those whose works have public effects. In an age of mass media and marketing, 
many of those who write from outside the academy and for audiences outside 
it, on the one hand, might gain significant notoriety but are merely ineffectual 
popularizes of ideas that are “vacuous and hollow,” whereas many who work 
within the academy and write principally for other academics, on the other, 
powerfully influence the broader world.2 By both West’s and Dewey’s 
accounts, the latter are far more deserving of the title “public philosophers” 
than the former. 
Much of conventional political philosophy treats the public sphere as an 
accomplishment and property of states, as an arena wherein states, especially 
democracies, do their business. For Dewey such an account looks for the public 
in the wrong places and perverts the relationship between publics and states. 
Publics, as we have seen, grow out of the concrete problems generated by the 
indirect consequences of human actions. States, then, are primary machineries 
of publics, instruments by which publics aim to regulate such indirect effects 
and to solve the problems that have brought them into being (LW 2, 259). 
Healthy publics demand constant accountability from democratic state 
bureaucracies. The apparatuses of the state might propagate themselves in 
disregard for the publics that created them and for the latter’s problems, which 
they were intended to solve, and they might persist even after the publics’ 
problems have been resolved, as Max Weber already well described. Such 
tendencies focus much of Dewey’s analyses. Political philosophers unwittingly 
contribute to the propagation of irrelevant, ineffectual, and obsolete state 
systems by seeing their task as determining “what the state in general should 
or must be” (256-57) and attempting to describe the universal, ideal form of 
the state, without regard for the concrete problems that generate the very 
                                                 
2 The Cornel West Reader (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999), p. 552. 
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publics for which states are but instruments, thereby allowing state structures 
to remain unaccountable to their publics (and their problems). 
The recovery of a sense of public responsibility among intellectuals is not 
incidentally but essentially tied to the recovery and reconstruction of 
philosophy, with which Dewey was so much concerned. In the Platonic 
tradition the task of the philosopher was to rise above the confusing 
multiplicity (panta) of everyday affairs and problems in order to apprehend the 
simple, eternal, unchanging forms, and the philosopher king directs the state 
to the solution of its concrete problems by keeping the forms of justice and 
goodness steadily in view. William James had already reversed all that: 
philosophical rigor, for him, was precisely a matter of keeping the messy, 
existential problems of life steadily in view and relegating ideals to the role of 
tools for the solution of such problems: “I do not believe it to be healthy-
minded to nurse the notion that ideals are self-sufficient and require no 
actualization to make us content, ... ideals ought to aim at the transformation 
of reality--no less!”3 As Dewey puts it, “What empirical method exacts of 
philosophy is two things: First, that refined methods and products be traced 
back to their origin in primary experience, in all its heterogeneity and fullness; 
so that the needs and problems out of which they arise and which they have to 
satisfy be acknowledged. Secondly, that the secondary schools’ methods and 
conclusions be brought back to the things of ordinary experience, in all their 
coarseness and crudity, for verification.”4 
James and Dewey thus stand on its head the popular notion, stemming 
from the Platonic tradition, that philosophy leads its students away from the 
concrete, bloody problems of life, into the world of sterile, anemic abstractions. 
Rather, Dewey assigns philosophy the role of, first, leading people, especially 
democratic citizens, back into the messy concreteness of their problems, which 
they, and not the philosopher, seek to evade; second, holding such problems, in 
all their complexity and messiness, tenaciously and steadily in view; and third, 
requiring all theoretical inquiry to answer to those problems: “Philosophy 
recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of 
philosophers [viz., the clarification of abstract concepts for its own sake] and 
becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers for dealing with the [concrete] 
                                                 
3James, Letter to Charles A. Strong, April 9, 1907, in The Letters of William James, ed. 
Henry James, 2 vols. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920): II, 270 (emphasis in the 
original). 
4 Experience and Nature (1929), in LW 1, 39. 
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problems of men [sic].”5 Healthy-minded philosophy preserves and deepens, 
rather than escapes from, the concreteness of life. Moreover, insofar as 
philosophical rigor consists in the philosopher’s attentiveness to the concrete 
problems of life and publics are defined by a significant set of concrete, human 
problems, such rigor is not merely something the philosopher may or may not 
choose to bring to bear on public problems. Rather, philosophical rigor 
demands attentiveness to public problems: it demands that philosophers be 
public intellectuals, not as a luxury but as a requirement of disciplinary rigor. 
The notion of a “public intellectual,” then, is, for Dewey, redundant: concern 
for public problems is an essential, not an incidental or optional, feature of 
intellectual life. 
Thus we arrive at the first two public responsibilities of philosophers 
particularly, but also, I suggest, of intellectuals in general. First, intellectuals 
contribute to the creation and preservation of healthy publics by helping to 
define and to keep steadily in view the concrete problems that generate the 
latter. Second, intellectuals provide general methods, both derived from the 
storehouse of tradition and forged anew, that direct social intelligence and 
resources better to the experimental solution of those problems. In Dewey’s 
words, “It is not the business of political philosophy and science to determine 
what the state in general should or must be. What they may do is to aid in 
creation of methods such that experimentation may go on less blindly, less at 
the mercy of accident, more intelligently, so that men may learn from their 
errors and profit by their successes” (LW 2, 256-57). By performing these tasks 
well intellectuals do much to help publics extract accountability from their 
states and help to insure that states remain the servants, and do not become 
the masters, of publics and the citizens who comprise them. 
Publics, as we saw above, are distinct from states, but they are also distinct 
from communities. Communities contain private and public aspects, and while 
some publics include communities and some publics evolve into communities, 
not all publics are communities: publics may be mechanistic associations, 
aiming to solve their problems solely “from external circumstances, pressure 
from without” (330) and lacking consciousness and feeling of a common inner 
life, shared meanings, and mutual interests. For publics to become 
communities they must express symbolically their problems and aspirations as 
                                                 
5 Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude (1917), in The Middle Works, 1899-
1924, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Vol. 10, 1916-17 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 
1980), p. 46. 
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shared and thereby engender a felt sense of a “general will.” My problem and 
your problem initially merely happen to coincide—e.g., we each, independently 
and individually, want better schools for our children--and we each seek to 
solve that problem for ourselves individually and only incidentally in 
collaboration. But as a result of our working alongside one another, as a 
public, we come to experience the merging of my problem and your problem so 
that they become our problem, and my victory and your victory become our 
victory. 
A main present barrier to the transformation of publics into communities is 
that publics have become “eclipsed” by restricted, largely moneyed corporate 
interests for control of the vast, sophisticated communications technologies of 
our time. Thus the latter are able to manipulate and direct cultural symbols, 
both of the past and of their own creation, so as to galvanize personal and 
social identities around their interests and aims and away from publics and 
their problems. For example, the symbols of patriotism are used to sell credit 
cards (Chase Bank’s “Freedom Card”), automobiles, and clothing, and thus, to 
use present examples, individuals might identify themselves more commonly 
with the “communities” of Mac-users, mini-van drivers, mall shoppers, and 
Abercrombie wearers rather than with publics that, e.g., combat 
environmental degradation, improve education or workplace conditions, or 
fight for greater justice in the distribution of wealth. Without proper access to 
and appropriation of symbolic technologies, publics remain fractured, 
disorganized, and mere aggregates of self-interested individuals, i.e., they 
remain merely associations (Gesellschaft) and not yet communities 
(Gemeinschaft). 
Intellectuals, though, are the master engineers of cultural symbol systems: 
they, through their education, best understand the history and power of those 
systems. For the most part, however, either they are employed by the 
moneyed corporate interests—for example, the majority of professional artists 
work in marketing—or they remain insulated and ineffectual in academic 
institutions, which, at least in the United States, are in the business primarily 
of producing human capital for the moneyed interests rather than solving 
public problems—many of which, of course, are generated by activities of 
those very moneyed interests. The public intellectual, then, wherever he or she 
may be employed, must swear unswerving allegiance to res publica, affairs of 
the public. Thus, a third public responsibility of intellectuals is to bring publics 
to self awareness by re-appropriating and redirecting cultural symbols and 
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forging new ones so as to create shared meanings and purposes and to cultivate 
feelings of common interest and will, feelings of a common life, and to thereby 
aid in the transformation of the Great Society into the Great Community. 
I wish now to suggest another area in which intellectuals have public 
responsibilities but at which Dewey merely hints and about which he has too 
little to say, that is, the responsibility of intellectuals to insure that the 
society’s most marginalized members are included in the publics that they—
the intellectuals—help to form. William James had already contended that 
rigorous empirical method in philosophy means not to be content with 
generalizations derived solely from the experiences of professional philosophers 
but inclusion of every perspective, including those who suffer social exclusion: 
“the experience of the entire human race must make the verification, and … 
all the evidence will not be ‘in’ till the final integration of things, when the last 
man has had his say and contributed his share to the still unfinished x.”6 
Therefore, it is the proper task of philosophers not to demolish other people’s 
most cherished beliefs but to seek out actively wisdom in all the overlooked 
places and persons, and James modeled his teachings, as his student Walter 
Lippmann testifies: “There was no trace of the intellectual snob in William 
James; he was in the other camp from those thin argumentative rationalists 
who find so much satisfaction in disproving what other men hold sacred. 
James loved cranks and naifs and sought them out for the wisdom they might 
have.”7 James’s remarks, however, seem to pertain to individuals, rather than 
to marginalized social groups, and to express something about what he takes 
to be a matter of methodological rigor in philosophy and not so much a matter 
of philosophers’ public responsibilities, although our analysis above suggests 
that for pragmatists such as James and Dewey, the two cannot be separated: 
philosophical rigor largely consists precisely in addressing the pressing, 
concrete problems of public life. 
In any case, the public responsibility of the intellectual, as we have seen 
above, might be summarized as one of cultivating a common world, a 
community, out of the public problems of citizens. Indeed, the very term 
“public intellectual” is redundant, too, for Cornel West, as it is for Dewey, 
because, for West also, intellectuals are essentially public persons, and not 
merely incidentally or as a matter of personal choice. West, however, puts the 
                                                 
6 James, “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1880), in The Writings of William James: A 
Comprehensive Edition, ed. John J. McDermott (New York: Modern Library, 1968), p. 343. 
7 Lippmann, A Preface to Morals (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. 24-25. 
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matter somewhat differently than does Dewey: “To be an intellectual really 
means to speak a truth that allows suffering to speak. That is, it creates a 
vision of the world that puts into the limelight the social misery that is usually 
hidden or concealed by the dominant viewpoints of a society.”8 West’s shift 
from “problems” to “suffering” is significant because it emphasizes the more 
disadvantaged members of society in defining “publics”: while all in the 
society experience problems, only the more disadvantaged are suffering. The 
latter experience their publics’ problems most severely and thereby know them 
most profoundly. 
Dewey hints in several places in The Public and Its Problems, and 
elsewhere, that healthy democratic communities are informed in the fullest 
possible measure by their entire membership: all members are enabled to speak 
and are listened to. Such sentiments seem to continue, in secular terms, a long 
tradition of the Reformation that imagines the equality of all believers before 
God and proclaims, as did Martin Luther, that “every man is his own priest”: 
simple faith, without need of any theological or philosophical instruction, gives 
one access to Truth. English Puritans brought that Reform tradition to 
America, and Jacksonian Democrats, who held that the ordinary common 
sense of the masses, without any special cultivation through education, is 
sufficient for full democratic participation, continued the Reformation’s 
egalitarian tradition in more secular terms. Transcendentalists, such as 
Whitman and Emerson, both of whom Dewey cites in this regard (LW 2, 350, 
372), gave this tradition perhaps its most poetic expression, and as much as 
Dewey revolted against New England Puritanism, he retained at least this 
central tenet of that religion as part of his own democratic faith. 
What follows from this egalitarian tradition, of which Dewey is an heir, are 
at least two implications: first, all members of the community deserve to be 
heard, and second, a proper role of the intellectual is not to make 
authoritative, priestly pronouncements for the community generally or to 
speak for the marginalized in particular but to help insure that all are equally 
heard themselves. The task of building a common world surely requires that 
every member of the society have an opportunity to participate in public life, 
that is, to articulate what they take the public problems to be and how they 
experience them. As W. E. B. Du Bois proclaimed, in speaking not only about 
African Americans and women but all marginalized members of society, 
“desperately we need this excluded wisdom,” for “there is lost from the world 
                                                 
8 Reader, p. 551. 
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an experience of untold wisdom, and they [the voices of this ‘excluded 
wisdom’] must be raised rapidly to a place where they can speak.” However, 
“Only the sufferer knows his sufferings,” and therefore those who suffer must 
articulate their own interests first-hand: others, such as the politician, social 
worker, or intellectual cannot speak adequately for them.9 Futhermore, while 
everyone has a general responsibility to make sure that his or her neighbors are 
all heard, intellectuals, as a result of their education, have a special 
responsibility to be sensitive to and an ability to seek out those who have been 
silent and silenced. 
Equality, though, is an insufficient principle by which to speak about 
participation in democratic community: not all suffer equally from public 
problems. For example, while all members of the society might desire better 
education, sanitation, and health care, not all suffer equally from deficiencies 
in such areas. Therefore, it is important that intellectuals, in performing their 
public duty of insuring that all members of society are heard from, make 
certain that those suffering the most from public problems are given special 
hearing. Indeed, numerous African American and feminist thinkers argue for 
this need to privilege the voices of the most marginalized and for intellectuals 
to seek them out systematically, to ask routinely and rigorously, “From whom 
are we not yet hearing?” and “Who are the most disadvantaged and 
suffering?” 
Jane Addams provides a model of what it means for an intellectual, in 
West’s sense of the term—as one who “allows suffering to speak”—to ask such 
questions habitually, systematically, and rigorously. In Democracy and Social 
Action, for example, she describes eloquently the need in a democracy for 
maximal inclusiveness of voices and how such inclusiveness is central to her 
understanding of “social ethics”: “We know at last, that we can only discover 
truth by a rational and democratic interest in life, and to give truth complete 
social expression is the endeavour upon which we are entering. Thus the 
identification with the common lot which is the essential idea of Democracy 
becomes the source and expression of social ethics. It is as though we thirsted 
to drink at the great wells of human experience, because we knew that a 
daintier or less potent draught would not carry us to the end of the journey, 
going forward as we must in the heat and jostle of the crowd.”10 
                                                 
9 Du Bois, Darkwater (1920), in The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader, ed. Eric. J. Sundquist 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 555. 
10 Democracy and Social Ethics (1902; Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2002), p. 9. I 
K.W. STIKKERS 
 
 204
Addams’s concern for inclusiveness, however, does not stop with theory. In 
The Long Road of Woman’s Memory she describes how, in the context of her 
work at Hull House, she continuously sought out and listened to those 
women’s voices that had been most silenced and marginalized by their cultures 
and were most perplexing to her.11 Furthermore, her Peace and Bread in Time 
of War describes how she convened the International Congress of Women, at 
The Hague in 1915, in order to give voice to “the common lot” of humanity on 
an international scale.12 
Furthermore, intellectuals who are also themselves representatives of 
traditionally marginalized social groups seem generally more capable of 
articulating this need for inclusion than those, like Dewey, who, because of 
their relatively privileged status in the society, too easily take participation in 
public life for granted. Consider, for example, African American philosopher 
Angela Davis’s suggestion, in her pioneer essay making the case that Frederick 
Douglass warrants inclusion in the literature of philosophy, that those who 
have been historically denied human freedom might be better able to 
articulate the nature and conditions of freedom than those who take their 
freedom for granted and who might even have it in their interests to continue 
the denial of freedom to others: “Are human beings free or are they not? Ought 
they be free or ought they not be free? The history of Afro-American literature 
furnishes an illuminating account of the nature of human freedom, its extent 
and limits. Moreover, we should discover in Black literature an important 
perspective that is missing in so many of the discussions on the theme of 
freedom in the history of bourgeois philosophy. Afro-American literature 
incorporates the consciousness of a people who have continually been denied 
entrance into the real world of freedom, a people whose struggles and 
aspiration have exposed the inadequacies not only of the practice of freedom, 
but also of its very theoretical roots.”13 
Those who have suffered as a result of being systematically “denied 
entrance into the real world of freedom” have a special interest in articulating 
________________________________________ 
am grateful to Mr. Michael Jostedt for calling to my attention this and other important, 
related passages from Addams. 
11 The Long Road of Woman’s Memory (1916; Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2002). 
12 Peace and Bread in Time of War (1922; Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2002). 
13 Davis, “Unfinished Lecture on Liberation—2,” in Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology 
of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917, ed. Leonard Harris (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 
1983), p. 90. 
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with maximal clarity those universal qualities upon which claims to rights and 
freedoms are made. By contrast, those who take such rights and freedoms for 
granted are not so motivated but are more likely to avoid such clarity so as to 
conceal and protect their privileged social status. 
West makes a similar point with respect to Du Bois and correctly claims 
that Du Bois was the first to understand the privileged position of the 
suffering oppressed in bringing humanity to a fuller understanding of the 
universal conditions for its freedom, dignity, and noblest possibilities. “Du 
Bois goes beyond them all [all the pragmatists] in the scope and depth of his 
vision: creative powers reside among the wretched of the earth even in 
[especially in?] their subjugation and the fragile structures of democracy in the 
world depend, in large part, on how these powers are ultimately exercised.”14 
It is “the wretched of the earth” who, in speaking from their suffering, are 
best able to articulate the problems of publics. A generic problem of 
democratic publics is the expansion and protection of basic rights and 
freedoms, and those intellectuals who speak from the suffering of having been 
denied such rights and freedoms, will likely be able to describe best both the 
nature of and remedy for this problem. Their experiences and perspectives 
therefore need to be given not merely equal consider but to be privileged. 
Thus, in this essay I have suggested that one of John Dewey’s most 
profound and enduring contributions to political philosophy has been his 
introduction and development of a distinct notion of “publics,” those forms of 
association wherein persons come together to solve their concrete common 
problems. Publics are distinct from both communities and states, although 
they might grow into communities and they use the machinery of the state as 
tools for solving their problems. Dewey further suggests several distinct 
responsibilities that intellectuals generally, and philosophers in particular, 
have with respect to publics: identifying and maintaining publics’ foci on the 
concrete problems that define them, aiding in the development of experimental 
methods whereby social intelligence and resources might be best directed 
toward the solution of public problems, and bringing publics to self-awareness 
through the use of traditional cultural symbols and the forging of new symbols 
to create shared meanings and feelings of common interest. I have further 
suggested another responsibility that intellectuals have to publics, but at 
which Dewey merely hints, namely, rigorously and systematically seeking out 
                                                 
14 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p. 148. 
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those who have been most marginalized in the society and creating 
opportunities for their “suffering to speak.” I have offered Jane Addams as an 
example of a public intellectual who modeled admirably the fulfillment of this 
responsibility. Only by special attention to the suffering of their most 
oppressed members can publics effectively address their problems and Dewey’s 
(and Josiah Royce’s) hope for the “Great Community” be realized. 
